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ISummary
The author has spent dose to ten years as advisor to
planning organisations in four developing countries:
Pakistan, Kenya, the Sudan and Bangladesh. He raises the
question whether the work of the advisory teams resulted
in lasting improvements in the performance of these
organisations. There is no doubt that the professional
competence was improved while the team were there, als o
due to better performance by the counterpart staff. But
very frequently successfully trained counterparts move to
other organisations, or abroad, and this seriously
weakened the impact. On the other hand an increased
supply of well educated nation als has contributed to
improved professional performance. But support to
institution development cannot be expected to have strong
short term effects as long as there is scarcity of well
qualified national professional personnel.
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The Issue
In recent years increasing emphasis has been put on "good governance" as an
essential precondition for growth and development in poor countries. Good
governanee depends primarily on the political situation in each country. If the
government in power follows policies which inhibit growth; and if the very
legitimacy of the government is disputed with severe disorder, or even civil war
as result, no amount or form of foreign development assistance can lead to
economic growth and social development. However, many governments clearly
demonstrate wilingness to undertake actions that wil foster development, but the
government machinery may be weak and in any case badly adapted to initiate' and
implement effective measures. This weakness has been fully recognised by the aid
donor countries and international organisations from the very beginning of the
international efforts to assist the "underdeveloped" or later "developing countries"
in their struggle to escape from stagnation and poverty. Support to "institution
building" in independent developing countries started more than fort Y years ago,
and the present emphasis on it in Norway and elsewhere is n'othing new.
Personally I became involved in such efforts almost fort y years ago, and in this
essay I wil look back on my own experiences in developing countries in Asia and
Africa and try to assess whether the challenge was met in a satisfactory manner,
and whether the results have justified the costs in terms of both financial and
human resources, on the part of the recipient countries as well as the various
donor organisation.
In the years 1959 to 1961 I worked in the Planning Commission in Pakistan, as
industry adviser but, as member of a team, I also was involved in more general
development issues; in 1965 to 1968 in the Ministry of Economic Planning and
Development in Kenya as general economic adviser; in 1974 to 1975 in the
Planning Commssion in the Sudan, as leader of an international team of economic
advisers; and finally in 1983 to 1985 in the Planning Commssion in Bangladesh
as member of a team for reform of the country's trade and industrial policies. In
all four cases the donors ' intention was to improve the capacity of the host
organisations to analyse economic and social problems and opportunities to design
policies that should lead to effective implementation and improved performance.
In all these cases, on the job training of "counterparts" from the host country was
meant to be the way in which these tasks should be carried out.
In all four countries there were teams of advisers from different countries and
which consisting of about 6 to 8, up to 15 members. In Pakistan and Kenya a
private nongovernmental organisation, the Ford Foundation in the United States,
financed the operation, and in the case of Kenya the Foundation was also directly
responsible for the management of the team. But in Pakistan the management and
professional backstopping was by provided by Harvard University in the form of
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a Harvard Advisory Group. It was a pioneer effort which later led to the
establishment of the present Harvard Institute for International Development
(HIlD). In the Sudan and Bangladesh, however, it was the international
development organisations who financed and provided oversight of the operations.
The team in Khartoum in the Sudan was financed by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), but the operation was excuted by the World
Bank. In Bangladesh the source of finanee was an IDA loan by the World Bank
to Bangladesh, and the World Bank assigned HIlD to manage the team and the
programme, but followed the progress Öf the project c1osely. In this essay I wil
concentrate on three issues which I consider the most important: the environment
in which the teams were working and the problems facing the respective countries;
the way in which the teams operated; and, to the extent possible, I wil assess the
impact of what was done. These issues wil be discussed seperately for each of the
four countries, in chronological order.
Pakistan
For me, as for many others who work for the first time in a developingcountry
in an unknown continent, being faced with the realities in Pakistan was to begin
with a cultural shock. As tourist I had earlier on only paid brief visits to a few
countries in the Middle East, and on arrival in Karachi I found much of the same.
In the city centre there were no shops displaying luxuries, nor any luxury hotels,
and public buildings were sober. But very soon I discovered that outside the centre
this rapidly growing metropolis consisted of vast areas of large and comfortable
one family houses surrounded by well kept gardens in sharp contrast to the desert
just outside the city limits. In these large areas the residents were not only
foreigners but mostly numerous well-to-do Pakstanis, while a very large part of
the urban population lived in shacks in slums which have to be seen, and smelt,
before someone from a wealthier country can grasp what poverty means in a
developing country. I also had the opportunity to visit the very austere but
nevertheless properly built dwellngs of lower level civil servants. The variations
in standards of living between the rich and upper middle c1asses, the lower middle
c1asses, and the very poor ones were, and still are, depressing to observe for
somebody from a country in which such poverty as stil exists must look like a
very comfortable way of living to the great majority of people in the poorest
countries even today. An immediate reaction wil inevitably be to ask if wealth
and income could not be more equally distributed. But as an economist and
statistician who in addition had been working for several years with the
compilation and use of national income data, I knew only too well that the wealth
of the more well-to-do people only to a limited extent in practice could be
redistributed, and that the impact of such a redistribution would not make most
destitute people less poor. The only basis on which poverty could be alleviated in
a sustainable way, would be through greatly increased production and national
income. However, when faced with such striking evidence of misery, I like so
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many others felt strongly that growth and development from the very beginning
would have to be in a form that benefit the people at large, and not only small
minorities.
My workplace in the Planning Commssion was in a sober building, and the office
equipment was spartan, with, at best, only ceiling fans in the offices which made
it uncomfortable to work in a city where the temperature of ten reaches 40 degrees
during the better part of the year. Such work environment undoubtedly helps to
explain why the performanee of most of the staff was slow and of ten of poor
quality. The foreign advisers had the benefit of arriving much better prepared to
work after a good sleep in an air-conditioned bedroom! Most of the work in the
sections dealing with the different economic and social sectors, such as the
industry section to which I was attached, consisted of reviewing proposals for new
projects, or reports on ongoing ones. New letters and other documents were put
on fies which contained all previous documentation on a given subject. This
meant that in some cases the offcial in charge could be faced with several very
fat folders. Each case would normally move down to the most junior Planning
Officer, and then upwards again to the Chief of the section who would forward
his recommendations to the top management. The sense of hierarehy. was very
strong, and for a foreigner it was interesting to observe that anything that
ressembled manual work was avoided by professionals at all leveIs: an officer
would call the "peon" (messenger) to move a fie folder from his own desk to that
of a colleague for further review, even within the same room. The stenographer
who had written what I had dictated, would send the paper by a peon, and had I
followed the usual procedure, I would have had to call my peon to take the paper
back to the typist with my corrections. However, as a foreigner I did not loose
face by walking to the typing pool and talk to my male stenographer directly.
These cumbersome work practices clearly slowed down the speed of operations.
The role of asector adviser was to add his comments and suggestions to those of
the junior and senior officiaIs. This was an interesting and challenging task. With
the exception of the Chief whom I had as "counterpart" during the last year of my
work in Pakistan, the other officers would in most cases only make rather formal
observations to the cases under review. Yet, for a considered advice or decision
it was absolutely necessary to look into substantive issues. Take the case of project
proposals which contained a number of assumptions about the suitablity of
proposed location, raw material supplies, access to electricity, natural gas and
transport facilities, markets for the products etc. For large projects the proposals
were usually supported by beautifully presented reports by consultants, domestie
and of ten foreign. Frequently there was reason to question many of the
assumptions made, and if some of them clearly were on the optimistic side, the
profitabilty shown for the project would become very doubtfuL. It was not always
so easy for a foreigner to point out such doubts, as many Pakistanis would
consider it as arrogant on the part of people from the industrialised North to
question their abilty to build competing manufacturing industries of their own.
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However, it was possible to refer to other cases, to projects under implementation
or which were already under operation which had suffered from severe cost
overruns, or were operating well below the installed capacity.
When I arrived in Pakistan the fragile democratie system of the country had
broken down and general Ayub was ruling the country with absolute power. The
first years of his dictatorship turned out to be more successful than many
observers had feared in advance. He gave the Planning Commission an important
role. The new Chairman was given the rank of a cabinet minister, and he was a
very competent administrator. The Harvard Advisory Group had already been in
Pakistan for some years, and a first five year plan document had been written, but
had not had a decisive impact on policies and project selection yet. But the Second
Five Year Plan, covering the years 1960-65 was expected to become a far more
important document which would guide policyactions and administrative
decisions, and drafts on the plan were under elaboration. As asector adviser it was
not my role to write a chapter on manufacturing industries, but I tried to ful fi my
ro le as an adviser by presenting apaper which outlined which data had to be used
as basis for plans for the different sub-sectors.
In some branches of the manufacturing sector most if not all of the new capacity
would be created in the public sector. The Pakistan Industrial Development
Corporation (PIDC) had very dynamc leadership and had already built a number
of factories in different sectors of the economy (notably jute textiles, cement,
fertilisers, pulp and paper, mechanical industries, and sugar), both in West and
East Pakstan. The idea behind PIDC was that it had to build factories which
would have been too large for the private sector to create, because of lack of
capital and experienced management, but when they were in operation, they could
eventually be sold to private owners. The new plan would contain lists of projects
to be implemented by PIDC. In most branches of manufacturing the new capacity
would be created by private firms, but investment in new capacity was subject to
government licencing. Hence the plan should contain targets that would set the
limits for how many licences should be given.
During my first year in Pakstan the industry section had very weak leadership as
it only had an acting chief. I kept on asking my counterparts how they had
advanced on preparing draft sections on the different branches of manufacturing,
and when nothing had been written three days before the time limit set by the
strict Chairman of the Commission, I had only one thing to do: write the chapter
myself, on the basis of statistics and other data I had assembled in the meantime.
This was all wrong, of course, but it had to be done, and was so in the course of
a couple of extremely hectic days at the end of which a couple of the Planning
Officers and I myself assisted the c1erical staff in assembling and stapling together
the required number of stenciled copies early in the morning of the day of the
deadline, before I drove them all to their respective quarters, and returned home
at 4 AM.
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My version of the draft chapter raised a very delicate political issue. West Pakistan
was the main producer of raw cotton in undivided India, but when the partition
took place on 15th August 1947 what became West Pakstan did not have a single
large scale cotton spinning and weaving factory. Such factories were only on the
Indian side of the new frontier. Similarily, most of the raw jute in India was
grown in what became East Pakstan, but almost all of it was processed into jute
fabrics in the area around Calcutta in the Indian state of West Bengal. In the early
1950s the government of Pakistan declared that as from the middle of the 1950s
no more cotton textile import would be licenced, and the rich merchants, many of
them who had come to West Pakistan from India after partition, managed to build
up a large cotton textile industry from scratch in the course of a couple of years.
Some cotton mills were also established in East Pakistan. However, the need for
industrial expansion was even more urgent in the East and in the West, and my
proposal was that the future expansion of cotton manufacturing should take place
in the East. My argument was that virtually all developing countries build up their
own textile industries as a first step towards industrialisation, and East Pakistan
should not be deprived of that opportunity even though the cotton was grown in
the West. As regards the development of the jute textile industry in the East, it
had mainly been undertaken by PIDC because only a few rich businessmen had
settled in the East and were able to create a large export oriented jute
manufacturing sector with their own resources.
The newly created cotton textile industry had a capacity that far exceeded the
domestie market, and some exports took place. The jute textile industry was from
the very beginning created for export in line with the prevailing idea that poor raw
material exporting countries should proeess their raw materials and thus create
more income and employment. Both industries had larger capital costs than their
competitors, notably in India, and in addition their management and workers had
far less experience. In order to make these industries able to export on a profitable
basis, around 1960 Pakistan introduced the so-called export voucher scheme for
all manufacturing industries. The country was permanently short of foreign
currency, exporters had to sell all their foreign exchange earnings to the central
bank, and imports were controlled by strict licencing, and foreign goods, both
consumer goods, raw materials and capital equipment were in short supply. The
scheme that was introduced gave the exporters the right to keep 20 or in most
cases 40 per cent of their foreign exchange earnings in the form of vouchers that
gave them the automatie right to import goods that were subjected to a less
stringent import control procedure. These inc1uded a number of consumer goods,
raw materials, spare parts and even machinery and equipment. The exporters did
not need to use the vouchers themselves, but could sell them to other importers
of goods, and an organised market developed for export bonus vouchers, that
initially were sold at 150 to 175 per cent of their face value. An exporter with 40
per cent export bonus entitlement therefore earned 60-75 per cent extra on the top
of the sales price. This lead to a very significant expansion of exports from several
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manufacturing industries, and improved the profitability of the cotton and jute
textile industries dramatically.
I have not found any documentation that indicates who succeeded to persuade the
government to introduce this scheme that helped Pakstan to surpass the targets in
the plan period 1960-65, but I was not personally involved. However, my work
with the draft chapter for the various manufacturing industries had made me
realise that attempts to set produetion and capacity targets for individual industries
had to be based on far more analytical work than was done at that time. In the
case of the so-called import substitution industries, targets were set on the basis
of actual imports plus assumed surpressed demand because of import restrictions,
to which was added projected increase in demand, and, in fact, most of these data
were pure "guesstimates".
While stil in Pakistan, I started to collect data that could be used to establish an
input-output table which could provide more consistent projections of the demand
for final and well as intermediate goods. In connection with the publication of the
Second Five Year Plan, the Planning Commission also published a Perspective
Plan for the period 1960-85, presenting many over-optimistic targets.
When I returned to Norway in 1961, I became member of a research team in the
Chr. Michel-sen Institute, financed at that time by the Rockefeller Foundation, and
I therefore had the opportunity to analyse the data further, using an input-output
framework as analytical tool. i My study led to two important conclusions: first
the high growth targets at the end of the period were probably far too optimistie,
and second, it would not be possible, as the Perspective Plan had projected, to
close the gap in per capita income between East and West Pakistan during that
period.
On the latter point, while stil in Pakistan, I had made a study of the regional
incomes of the two provinces of Pakstan and produced apaper which showed that
the income per capita in East Pakistan was considerably lower than in the West,
and that the gap was growing. I distributed that paper within the Planning
Commission, and many years later a senior official in Pakistan, who worked in the
Planning Commssion when the paper was distributed, told me that the Chairman
had been furious when he received the paper, and had issued an order that all
copies of it should be destroyed. This ilustrates how difficult the relations
between the two "wings" of Pakistan had become already at the beginning of the
1960s.
The results were pub1ished in Ole David Koht Norbye, Development prospects of Pakistan,
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1968.
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The Harvard Advisory Group in Pakstan at that period was quite large, with 7-8
advisers in Karachi and two each in the provincial capitals Lahore in the West and
Dacca in the East. The team, while mostly including US nationals, also had
several non-American members. Most of us were economists, but the team also
had several non-economists; a sociologist had just left when I joined the team, and
the housing sector was advised by an architect. It was much up to the individual
adviser to plan their work, and to a large extent the work was decided by the
issues that their respetive counterparts had to deal with. The relationship between
the advisers and their counterparts was very friendly, ahâ resulted in several life
long friendships. The team members had regular meetings between themselves in
which current issues were discussed. From the summer of 1960 the team had a
very dynamic and imaginative team who held frequent meetings to discuss in
depth his own ideas which were aimed at speeding up development, notably by
asking for more food aid to be used for rural development programmes in
particular. In so doing he acted more as a policyadviser than as an institution
builder, but the role of the team members remained the strengthening of the
analytical and managerial competence of the host country's own staff.
It is difficult to assess if the team members succeeded to do so in the short run.
My own main counterpart was a thoughtful and hard working elderly civil servant
who relied on his judgment and experience, but who appreciated my own attempts
to develop analytical work. A young, bright economist from East Pakistan also
joined the section, as Deputy Chief, while I was there. He had no practical
experience, and he later left for further studies in England, and after a period of
work in the independent Bangladesh, he eventually ended up as international civIl
servant in the United Nations. The other Deputy Chief, who was acting when I
arrived, was engineer and had very rarely any substantive observations to make
to matters that he dealt with. (He apparently later went to West Africa as UN
financed industrial adviser.) I doubt if the junior staff really benefited much from
my presenee in the section although I had very good working relations with them.
There were other intellectually lively people in the Planning Commssion at that
time, notably Mahbub-ul-Haq who later had a briliant career in the World Bank,
as Minister for Finanee and Planning in Pakstan, and then in the UNDP where he
created the annual Human Development Report. He certainly absorbed very well
the ideas and experiences of his foreign counterparts, but as he left the Planning
Commssion rather soon, it did not contribute to the strengthening of the institution
Itself. In short, when I look back on what happened, I find that too many of the
"best and the brightest" left their institution for other challenges, and that many
of the analytical efforts of the advisers may not have survived theIr departure. The
quality of the work in the Planning Commission in Pakistan has certainly
improved over time, notably due to the arrival of better educated younger people.
I had the opportunity to visIt the Planning Commssion in Islamabad more than
15 years later, then installed in modern, comfortable premises in Pakistan's new
capital, and the documentation published was c1early of a better quality than
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earlier. However, when in the 1980s I came to work with the Planning
Commssion in Bangladesh, I was a bit disturbed by finding that much of the work
in the sector sections was conducted more or less as in Karachi 25 years earlier.
There was some interesting analytical work going on, either undertaken by foreign
professionals or by single individuals, but as an institution it was stil characterised
more by routine procedures than by analytical work.
Up on my arrival in Pakistan I was faced by an important problem: should I try to
learn Urdu? For several reasons the allswer was nO. In àtwo year assignment one
wil hardly learn enough to be able to use the language until it was time to leave;
in Pakistan the problem also was that people from East Pakistan do not generally
understand Urdu; they speak Bengali; and finally English was the working
language. It is, of course, agreeable to be able to speak to ordinary people, but the
results of the efforts of somebody who has not a great talent for learning a foreign
tongue do not justify the time unavoidably taking away from the professional
pursuits. It is one thing I remember which I later learned to appreciate highly.
When I arrived in Karachi, I was met by the team' s administrative officer who
told me that Lwas too welLpaid to use my time on practical matters, and instead
I should concentrate on my professional job. Practical problems should be left to
him and his office! In later assignments I learned fully to appreciate this: far too
much time was then used to find housing, dear goods through custom, find
workmen to repair things that were out of order etc. Another very good side of my
first assignment was that I was allowed to travel frequently and exstensively in
both provinces of Pakistan. In the provincial capitals we stayed with our team
colleagues there and thus got a better insight in what happened at the provincial
leveL. Most of these travels was paid by the Advisory Group itself, but there were
occasions when I accompanied. my counterpar of field trips as well. Such
travellng is essential for a foreigner in order to better appreciate the situation in
the country in which he is working. In particular I remember the fascinating
experience of visits to a great variety of small industri al workshops which turned
out the most incredible products under very primitive conditions. It was obviously
very important to observe rural conditions more c1osely; particularly since at that
time the great majority of people lived in purely rural areas.
Kenya
With impressions from Pakstan stil in fresh memory it was a bit of a culture
shock to arrive in 1965 in Kenya's capital Nairobi. It was then a middle-sized,
pleasant, well bu ilt modern city with fine hoteIs, luxury shops, even a super
market, beautiful parks and excellent streets. The slum are as were at that time not
large, but underneath the almost European surface there was a social structure of
the same kind as in other poor developing countries: a small, very prosperous
minority who enjoyed all kinds of modern comfort; a relative small lower middle
dass of shopkeepers, artisans, qualified manual workers and lower leve! civil
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servants who lived in austere, but decent conditions; and the large majority of the
rural people, and casual or "informal sector" workers and new migrants in the
towns. Measured in terms of national income per capita Kenya was as poor as
Pakistan, but it did not give the visitor the same impression of deep and hopeless
poverty. But basically the problems were the same in both countries.
When I arrived in Kenya it had not yet celebrated its sec ond anniversar of
independence. Kenya had been one of the pearls of the British Empire. Its pleasant
c1imate had led to a significant immgration of Europeans who had arranged to
build an administrative and physical infrastrueture that resembled that of the
mother country. During the Mau Mau uprising some few years before
independence in 1963 the Kikuyu leader Kenyatta had been looked upon as the
devil himself by the European setters; as President he suddenly enjoyed the
confidence of almost everybody. One old Norwegian coffee farmer told me that
he considered that they now had one of the best governments in the world. Once
more I had the privilege of working in a country with "good governance".
Working and living conditions in Kenya were excellent. The climate is very good,
no air conditioning was needed in offices that were located in well built and
maintained government buildings, comfortable houses surrounded by gardens were
available at reasonable prices, and shops had plenty of all kinds of goods a
European from a well-to-do country needed or wanted to buy. No ne ed for private
imports, with the associated has sle to have them c1eared through custom.
When I arrived in September 1965, a team from the Ford Foundation had already
worked for some time in the Minïstry of Economic Planning and Development
(MEPD). The Foundation had a well staffed office in Nairobi, headed by a series
of highly competent persons, who directly managed the team and provided such
logistic support as was needed: finding houses and providing furniture, supplying
the advisers with cars etc. An American professor, Ed Edwards, who had been
economic adviser but had left shortly before my arrival, had had a particularly
strong intluence on the Minister, Tom Mboya who himself was aremarkable
intelligent, competent and dynamic personality. As he belonged to the Luo tribe,
which at that time represented the principal cha1lenge to the supremacy of the
Kikuyus, he had many enemies, and his competence and thorough knowledge of
practically all matters discussed in the cabinet, did not make him more popular
amongst his colleagues. (Re was assasinated in 1969.) Re and his adviser wrote
in 1965 the famous "Sessional Paper no. 10 - 1965: African socialism and its
application to planning in Kenya". It argued in favour of a mixed economy, clearly
influenced by both United States "liberal" and European social democratie ideas.
It was from the very beginning derided by radical intellectuals, both Kenyans and
foreign, and became even more controversial when President Nyerere in Tanzania
in the Arusha Dec1aration of 1967 outlned the more radical "real" road to African
Socialism.
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The Ministry of Economic Planning and Development was a new ministry and,
with the exception of the then Statistics Devision, it was staffed only by Kenyans,
mostly Africans and a few Asians (after the partition of India, Indian immigrants
in East Africa were referred to as Asians). The ministry was under staffed, and the
advisers, not only from Ford Foundation, but from United Kingdom and France
as well, had to do their full share of the day to day work. But we all had Kenyan
colleagues who also were our "counterparts". My principal counterpart during the
first couple of years was the Chief Planning Officer, the late Philp Ndegwa, later
one of Africa's most influential economists, who subsequently hel d several top
positions in Kenya (Permanent Seeretary; Governor of Bank of Kenya). In many
of the older ministries the top management was stil in the hands of British civil
servants, but the proeess of "Africanisation" was rapid, and most Permanent
Seeretaries and other top officials had been replaced by Kenyans when I left the
country at the end of 1968. In a few cases former British officials remained in the
ministry for some time as advisers.Towards the end of my stay I was assigned to
work on plan implementation, a very interesting task which requested field trips
with colleagues in the implementation section, and at times also the Assistant
Minister. As part of their training some Kenyan officers were sent abroad for
further studies, in at least one case, leaving the adviser without a counterpart.
Kenya is a good example of the inherent rivalry between a powerful Ministry of
Finanee and a government body in charge of overall planning. In Kenya the
MEPD was entitled to participate in the shaping of the annual development
budget, whereas the Ministry of Finanee had full controlover the recurrent
income and expenditure budget. A multiyear plan designed by the MEPD (and
subsequently approved by the government) would inc1ude planned development
expenditure by year, but its implementation would depend on the sIze of the
annual development budgets, which initia1ly would be decided by the Ministry of
Finance. The MEPD had to fight with the Ministry of Finanee to get enough funds
in the development budget to implement the plan. It was a difficult task as the
civil servants in the Ministry of Finanee were very prudent and conservative. Even
the very strong Minister of Economic Planning and Development, supported by
analytie work done by his ministry, did not always succeed. Also as regards the
release of money under the approved budget, the Ministry of Finanee exercised a
strong influence. However, in the course of the late 1960s mutual respect and
cooperation between the two key ministries increased considerably.
In the first year of my stay as economic adviser it became my principal task to
help put together and draft parts of the country's first Development Plan 1966-70.
A key issue was the growth of the national income that could be assumed for the
plan period, not only because of its impact on the wellbeing of people, but also
because it would be the basis for the mobilisation of domestic resources for the
development effort. Professor Edwards had proposed a relatively modest growth
target, and in a short repeat visit to Kenya he insisted that this should not be set
higher. However, as a national income statistician I was myself not convinced and
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had lengthy discussions with a very competent Kenyan officer in charge of
national income estimation in the Statistics Division. From our review of the
growth potential for sectors other than agriculture and manufacturing we concluded
that the target could be raised. (In fact, the growth during the five year plan period
exceeded also the higher targetY In the MEPD the responsibility for estimating
government revenues was in charge of a competent Kenyan (not supported by any
foreign adviser) who produced relevant analytical work.
It was easier to formulate a consistent development plan inKenya than it had been
in Pakistan. The availabilty of data was better and more reliable. But agriculture
represented a crucial but somewhat unpredictable factor. Modern market oriented
farming had been established in Kenya by mostly European immgrants on large
farms, plantation estates and ranches. Only towards the end of British rule were
African smallholders permitted to grow export crops, notably coffee. The foreign
settlers had taken land which seemed to them not to be used by the native
population, but at independence population pressure in some areas, notably the
Kikuyu districts north of Nairobi, had become very heavy, and a large area of
settlerfarms was expropriated and allocated to African farmers. Initially, the
newcomers could not farm the land as efficiently as the settlers had been able to,
and the future growth of farm produetion was considered as uncertain. Later
developments have been favourable, however. As regards manufacturing the
modern industries were owned by European and Asian immgrants and some
foreign firms, and its further expansion was mainly to take place in the private
sector. A critical issue was the development of the transport network. The railways
were the backbone of the transport network, and donors insisted that it should
continue to be so and would help to improve their efficiency. The donors refused
to help finanee an all year motorable road between Nairobi and the port city
Mombasa, but the government went ahead and financed it by its own resources,
a decision which proved to be sound. It is not always wise by a developing
country to be led by foreign advice and pressure.
The existing transport network mainly served are as in the "highlands" in which
foreign immgrants had settled. During the last year of my assignment in Kenya
I also visited are as mainly inhabited by the original population, and travels to such
places were uncomfortable and dust Y in dry weather and became very hazardous
when it was raining! Almost ten years later I revisited some of the same areas
which then were served by excellent hard surface roads, and it was remarkable to
observe how the economic and social conditions had changed during such a short
period.
2 The management of the Statistics Division expressed interest in supplementing the existing
national income estimates with an input-output matrix which inter alia would better assure that
the estimates were internally consistent. Work on such an input-output matrIx was started
shortly after the end of my stay in Kenya, with researchers from Chr. Michelsen Institute
undertakng inuch of the work.
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The government sought to ensure that the local communities themselves could take
part in determining projects to which central governments funds would be
allocated to the different rural areas. Various types of development bodies were
established at provincial and district leveIs, and provincial planning officers were
posted in several of the 8 provinces. They should also serve as secretaries in
meetings of the respective district bodies. These first attempts to ensure some
planning from below turned out to be rather inefficient. Lists of desired projects
were produeed, but it was virtually impossible to establish lists of priorities. The
system also involved bureaucratic prôblems.Provincial governors and district
commssioners and their staff depended on the Presidents office; the various
ministries had their own professional officers in the provincial headquarters, and
many of them were also represented at the district level. They all guarded their
territory jealously, and the role of the provincial planning officer, who depended
on the MEPD, was difficult, particularly as his role as coordinator could also
conflct with the role of the Presidents Office's representatives in the field. This
problem was stil present when the country study of Kenya was carried out in
1987.3 There was very little the Assistant Minister for Economic Planning and
Development and his officers coulddo to resolve these problems during their
inspection visits to meetings of provincial and district development bodies. Work
in the MEPD on plan implementation mostly involved an examination of reasons
for delays in plan implementation: whether they were caused by constraints of a
nature that affected all projects, or were caused by particular weaknesses in the
specific projects. My task included systematic work on drawing lessons from
failures.
Already in the 1960s it was evident that Kenya faced serious problems as regards
employment, education and rural development. The Kenya Council of Christian
Churches had rung a warning bell in a report which asked what would happen to
young people after schooL. It was no longer the case that primary school education
alone would open doors to employment. The people in many places in Kenya
sought to meet the challenge on their own by building Harambee secondar
schools, but these had eventually to be supported by teaching staff and money. In
1966 a conference on education, employment and rural development was held in
Kericho in the highlands and, inspired by the experience in Pakistan, Idelivered
a paper on long term employment prospects and the need for large scale rural
works programmes.4 In it I argued that in addition to work in agriculture, in the
modern sector, and various types of self-employment, it would be necessary to
mobilise people for work to improve conditions in rural areas. Such work had
been financed by food aid in Pakistan, but I maintained that donor agencies and
3
The Chr. Michelsen Institute, Kenya Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review, p.139, Bergen
1987.
4 Published in James R. Sheffeld (ed), Education, Employment and Rural Development, pp 239-
266, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1967.
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countries should provide money for such work: food aid should only be used if
there was a definite deficit in local food produetion.
From my own point of view my 3 1/3 years in Kenya certainly was the best
period of my life as adviser. It was not only a pleasant and easy place to live for
a family with small children, but it was also the period in which I felt that I had
been able to contribute most useful professional work. Moreover, it was easy to
be on informal, friendly terms with my Kenyan colleagues. Shortly after
independence the Kenyan professional staff, in particular the senior officers, were
reasonably well paid by Norwegian domestie standards, and even if foreign
advisers in Kenya were better off, we never-theless were on a roughly equal
footing. The crucial question, however, is whether the presenee of foreign advisers
resulted in making the MEPD a more efficient organisation in the longer run. I am
confident that we did, even though also in this case we were faced with the
familiar problem: not all staff members who worked with the advisers in MEPD
remained in that ministry. In this case, however, many of them served there for
a long period: two of them became Permanant Seeretaries before they moved on
to other challenges. Only one of my former senior counterparts ended up in an
international organisation.
A planning organisation has to have a strong capacity to undertake analytical
work. At the same time it also has bureaucratie functions to conduct, and the
danger is that this role wil become predominant. Ideally even the bureaucratie
function of approving programmes and projects or reviewing progress reports
should be based on analytic work. In fact, this is frequently not done: Too of ten
decisions wil be based on judgments flavoured by a variety of "pragmatie"
considerations; these can var from what is considered "politically feasible" to
purely practical assessments of what is thought to be within reach in existing
circumstances. My tentative view is that advisory services to an organisation that
is supposed to do more than merely routine operations, can improve its
performanee in the short run, but the long term effect wil be uncertain, depending
very much on individual staff members attitudes and abilities, and therefore largely
on a general improvement of the educational background of the staff. Fortunately,
in many developing countries the supply of well trained and motivated young
people is increasing rapidly. if such people are employed by an organisation, its
performanee wil improve, independently of technical assistance from abroad. At
the same time, however, an organisation that is staffed with well educated,
promising people can profit much more from technical assistance by experienced
people, specialists as well as "generalists" than can a poorly staffed organisation!
Institution building can not be achieved by foreign aid, but it can undoubtedly be
aided under favourable circumstances.
I wil take the opportunity to add some remarks on Norwegian technical assistance
through NORAD which happened to begin in Kenya in the middle of the 1960s.
The very first case was one expert was posted in Kenya in 1963 as director of the
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statistical services of the East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO).
When I arrived he had managed to make himself redundant by identifying two
very competent East African citizens who were promoted to Director and Deputy
Director respectively. It was an example of how technical assistance ought to
work; he himself stayed on as adviser for some time afterwards. In 1965 and
shortly afterwards NORAD sent a large number of professionals to Kenya, but
most of them had another task to perform: fil various posts for which qualified
Kenyans or East Africans were not yet available in sufficient numbers, such as
road engineers, secondary school teachers, architectsand workshop supervisors in
the East African Railways. This kind of "stop gap" technical assistance worked
very well as a means to make viable institutions continue to operate efficiently in
a difficult transitory period. There were also Norwegian technical experts who
worked in advisory positions, notably the consultants who served as members of
the Nordic advisory team to the cooperative movement. Their achievements are
more difficult to measure, but there can be no doubt about their competence; two
of them are today members of the Norwegian Parliament, and one is, in fact, the
Speaker. But the success of a co operative movement operating in rural areas
depends on a vast number of elected officials and paid staff, and an evaluation
undertaken in the 1970s east some doubt on whether it in Kenya served the
interests of the poorer farmers adequately.5 No amount of technical assistance can
prevent institutions from becoming the tools of the most powerful people,
nationally or in local communities.
The Sudan
In advanee I was somewhat worried about takng on an assignment in the Sudan,
as I had heard that it was difficult to work in that country. But when I went there
late in 1973 in order to be interviewed by the Sudanese authorities, I became
rather encouraged. The reception was very friendly, although my designated senior
counterpart warned me that I should not expect hard work from my Sudanese
colleagues: the persistent heat was not a favourable environment for strong efforts.
Another encouraging part during this exploratory visit was a field trip to the
famous Gezira Scheme, a large cotton producing irrigated area between the Blue
and the White Nile which was developed under British rule in the 1920s. It was
stil run in an authoritarian manner which compelled the farmers to follow
cropping patterns, plantation time etc. laid down by management.
The political environment at the time was promising. Admittedly the Sudan was
once more under military rule after the revolution of 1969 that brought general
Nimeiry into power, but his great achievement had been the Addis Ababa
5 Faaland, Just and Eirik G. Jansen, The Ro1e of Cooperatives in Rural Development in Kenya,
Eastern Africa Journal of Rural Development, voL. 12, no. 1-2, pp. 85-106, Kampala, Uganda,
1979.
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Agreement of 1972 which brought the civil war to an end and gave the three
Southern provinces an autonomous government. The country was governed by a
single party presidential system with Nimeiry as President. There was an elected
assembly, but all candidates had to be approved by the Sudanese Socialist Union
which had been established as a mass political party. However, the atmosphere
in the country during these first years of Nimeiry's rule was relaxed and optimisic.
The political situation appeared to be stable, and in some respects the Sudan
enjoyed reasonably "good governance" in most of the 1970s.
My role was to lead a UNDP financed advisory team. The management of the
team was in the hands of the World Bank. As adviser, and in particular as team
leader, I was faced with a practical situation quite different from the ones I had
experienced in Pakistan and Kenya. The administrative support to the project was
minimal and was provided by the UNDP office. We had to find our own houses
and buy our own vehic1es, furniture, household equipment etc, and it also in volve d
frequent clearing of imported Items through customs. There was a great scarcity
of consurner goods; however, as in Pakistan foreign technical assistance personneI
had the privilege to import goods. This eventually took the form of the right to
buy goods in a government corporation that operated a tax free shop at the airport,
one of the few, maybe the only one, of the government owned enterprises that
operated with a surplus. These practical problems took an inordinate amount of
time even though I eventually got a competent administrative assistant.
The advisory team consisted mainly of more experienced people than the young
and dynamic advisers I had worked with in Pakstan and Kenya, and inc1uded
several professionals from developing countries. I soon discovered that the World
Bank' s supervisor of the project had quite different ideas than I had about how the
team should operate. In my opinion the team members' principal task was to assist
and guide our counterparts in work assigned to them at any time, and, of course,
advisers should also initiate longer term work that would improve the professional
performanee in the sections to which they were attached. The World Bank's idea
was different. We were instructed to establish work plans for our respective
counterpart sections and then concentrate on implementing these plans. The
weakess of this approach was simply that the counterpart staff in many cases
showed no interest in carrying out the required enquiries, analyses etc.; some times
they did not even have the competence to do such work. Plans were prepared, but
as long as I was in Khartoum only in one section was part of the plans
implemented, and this only because the adviser in charge managed to find some
extra money to finanee the proposed study (which was traffc counts on some
major road connections in the Sudan, to establish the need for improvements of
the roads).
Also in another respect the World Bank's perception of the role of the planning
team differed from my own understanding of the job. It was not clearly said, but
certainly implicit, that the team should seek to influence crucial policy decisions.
15
For me the challenge was to improve the professional work in the organisation so
that it could produee an analytical basis for decisions on policy and changes in
policy. That would require patience, as considerable time would be neded for the
planning organisation to build up the required analytie capacity. The World Bank
was far more impatient. As a consequence, after one and a half year I was
informed by the Bank that, as I did not seem to have sufficient direct influence on
senior decision makers, I would be replaced by a senior, retired Pakistani civil
servant who might better exercise such influence. (It so happened that I was back
in the Sudan four years later when aBritish economist \Vas leading the team, and
his approach was much the same as mine.) One reason why neither the World
Bank's Resident Representative nor a planning team managed by the World Bank
could exercise any real influence on policies in the Sudan at that time was simply
that the World Bank's own leverage was at an absolute minimum. This was
shortly after the oil crisis of 1973 which led to very large surpluses of foreign
exchange for the OPEC countries. While the World Bank was involved in lengthy
negotiations with the Democratie Republie of the Sudan about the conditions of
a loan of the order of USD 15-20 milion, Saudi Arabia underwrote a loan of USD
200 milion to the Sudan.
The team was attached to the National Planning Commssion which was installed
in a splendid looking old government building near the Blue Nile. Large offices
with high ceilings were reasonably comfortable in the oppressive heat in
Khartoum. The much cheaper alternative to modern air-conditioning, air coolers
(which blow in humid air and are very efficient except when the air humidity
occasionally happens to be high) made working conditions bearable. But in other
respects the working environment was very difficult. The main reason was that by
then Arabie was the working language and therefore very little new documentation
was available in English. Irealised that this was a problem, and particularly during
the first half year of my stay, I studied Arabie rather intensively, but the
particularities of the Arabie script are such that one has to know Arabie well
before one can manage to read it! I was never anywhere near to getting that far.
It meant that I myself and most of my colleagues could never review documents
directly, but depended on oral communication with our counterparts. It had been
intended to provide us with translations of documents of interest, but as far as I
remember, it never happened. Most of the team members therefore had to work
a good deal on their own, on the basis of whatever material that stil existed in
English.
The team was also very isolated from the top management of the Planning
Commission. Some months after our arrival, a general was appointed as its head,
and my colleagues wanted, of course, to be introduced to him, and discuss matters
with him. It took me many months before he granted an audienee to us all - and
then once only.
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There was a five year plan for the Sudan, for the years 1970/71 to 1974/75, which
had been prolonged by two years. In addition there was a Phased Programme of
Action that had been published by the ruling party in 1972. The five year plan had
be en prepared by a group of experts from the Soviet Union, and was, in fact, a
very modest and rather conventional document, that mainly contained an
unpretentious list of development projects. Yet, the growth target was
unrealistically high. The Soviet Union had installed some paricularly unsuccessful
manufacturing enterprises in the country, the worst of which was probably a
tomato tinning factory in Wau, in the south western corner of the country, at the
end of a long and unreliable railway. There was not, by far, enough raw materials,
so the factory depended on tomato paste imported in barrels from Bulgaria; and
then the product had to be transported back to the principal markets in Khartoum
by rail.
The road system in the Sudan in the mid 1970s was highly primitive: the only
hardfaced road far out of the capital went to Wad Medani in the Gezira Scheme
area some couple of hundred kilometres south of Khartoum. The plan envisaged
improvements in the existing railway system, and the river transport on the White
Nile from Kosti south of Kharoum to Juba in the very south of the country.
However, the need for improvements in the road system was overwhelming, and
many new road projects were under consideration, outside the framework of the
existing five year plan. It should be remembered that the Sudan is the large st
country of Africa with Its 2.5 millon square kilometres.
At that time great hopes were expressed in making the Sudan "the bread basket
of the Arab world". The reason for this optimism was that it had been possible to
grow large quantities of sorghum, in particular by mechanised farming in dry
areas. Also groundnut produetion and exports had been expanded very rapidly.
Such developments had to be supported by better transport infrastrueture.
The implementation of the plan had fallen far short of the targets. The plan
assumed that development expenditure should increase from S£ 36 milion in
1970/71 to S£ 45 millon in 1974/75 (in 1969-prices). However, development
budget allocations had virtually exploded, to S£ 115 milion in 1973/74 and S£
194 millon in 1974/75. Yet, until 1974/75 actual expenditure did not increase, but
may even have fallen in real terrns, and as aresult actual development expenditure
fell from 71 per cent of the approved budget in the first year to 36 per cent in the
year 1973/74.
The development budget was available in English, but the monthly accounts were
available only in Arabie, but as I was able to read the numbers, I analysed the
most recent data for 1974/75 and found that actual development expenditure were
almost twice as high as the year before. It was clear that the expenditure side did
no longer bear any relation to availability of resources for development. I therefore
wrote a paper in which I pointed out the danger that the government would not be
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able to finanee its actual development expenditure and that it was meaningless to
continue with the so-called "umbrella budget" which the Ministry of Finanee
called it to explain why the budget exceeded the prospective resources. It was, of
course, a very good thing that the Sudan finally increased its development efforts,
but it was no longer possible to assurne that the projects inc1uded in the
development budget would be delayed to such an extent that financing would be
no problem. The warning was not listened to, and the next development budget
was planned at even higher leveIs. While the Sudan did not face an immediate
financing problem because of the large foreign loansgliaranteed by the oil-rich
Arab nations, the country very soon was in a very deep debt crisis. In this case our
team did indeed offer clear policy advice. The reason why our advice was not
heeded, was certainly not that the Minister for Finanee and the President did not
understand the problem; it reflected more the fact that the political situation was
much less stable than it appeared to be. As one observer expressed it: the
President is unable to say no to his "barons ", whose demands for budget
allocations were not effectively resisted.
My other main professional preoccupation concerned the national income
estimates. They were in a fairly poor shape, and some effort was done to obtain
the services of a national income expert then based in Addis Ababa, but it did not
materialise. Instead I reviewed the estimates myself. It became c1ear to me that the
growth in agriculture had been seriously underestimated, as they did not reflect the
large increase in the output of important crops. Revised estimates show ed that the
national income had grown at a satisfactory overall rate during the last few years.
These revisions became very useful when I became involved in the ILO/UNDP
Employment Mission 1975 to the Sudan which hap-pened to be headed by Just
Faaland from the Chr. Michelsen Institute. While he tried to have me as an offcial
member of that mission, the World Bank only allowed me to participate
informally, and effectively I could to ok full part in the mission's work. For me
this was a very valuable experience. When in late 1973 I accepted the assignment
as adviser in the planning team, it had been understood that I would travel around
in the country with Sudanese colleagues from the Planning Commission. This
never happened, and put me in a very different situation from what I had enjoyed
in Pakistan and Kenya. However, the ILO employment mission travelled
extensively and I was able to travel with them. The mission's work had been well
prepared by a three person team employed by the ILO to provide the mission with
necessary statistics and other information, and my own work on the national
income data thus supplemented other basic information.
There is no doubt that I myself and my team colleagues in the National Planning
Commission contributed to throw more light on various aspects of the Sudan's
development probIerns. We did not, however, contribute much to the strengthening
of the Planning Commssion as an institution. The language barrier is one reason
for this. Our counterparts spoke excellent English so there was no problem of oral
communication, but we never really worked together in the way I had been used
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to during my previous assignments. In fact, I hardly ever was able to find out
precisely what my counterparts actually worked on. My Arabie spe aking
colleagues in the advisory team, however, could manage to establish c10ser
relationships.
Later developments in the Sudan show that economic policies remained very
weak; thus the National Planning Commssion did not manage to influence such
policies in an effective manner. However, it has also to be remembered that the
Nimeiry regime gradually became weáker and eventua1ly was ousted from power.
A promising period of relatively "good governance" in many fields ended rather
quickly. Even a strong institution, if it can be established, is of little help if the
very legitimacy of the government is undermined.
Bangladesh
For twenty years, from 1963 to 1983 when I came back to Dhaka, I had not
visited the former East Pakistan that in the meantime had become the People's
Republie of Bangladesh. Dacca 20 years earlier had been a sleepy, provincial town
with a small modern business district between the government Secretariat and a
fine park area on one side and the bustlng old town on the other. From the old
airport a narrow road went towards town, past Farm Gate where a road took off
to the Jute Research Institute's farm, to the new, fashionable housing area
Dhanmandi with its spacious but plain houses surrounded by gardens with young
trees which brightened up an otherwise barren area. This time it was a shock to
come back to a place I knew from before. A four-Iane highway led to the city
from the new airport twelve miles from the city centre, and it passed large, new
housing areas for the wealthier inhabitants, before we reached densely built up
areas well before arriving at the old airport, and found that Farm Gate had become
one of the worst traffic bottleneeks amongst very many. The business district was
greatly expanded, with many skyserapers. The only really familar feature was the
tens of thousands bicycle rickshaws which stil are the means of transportation for
most people. The signs of development were overwhelmingly visible. But what
kind of development? Nature had played its part: the older houses in Dhanmandi
showed signs of decay due to the humid and hot climate, but this was
compensated by the lush vegetation that had turned the area into a pleasant
residential district dose to the city centre. A sizeable well-to-do middle dass lived
there and in the large, new subburbs. Many of them were professionals, self-
employed or in senior government positions, but for most of them their source of
income was import and retail trade and manufacturing which were lucrative
businesses for those who obtained government licences to import, or high tariffs
and import bans which made many branches of manufacturing profitable. Rent-
seeking was a major source of income. When I later visited rural areas, I found
a mixed picture; many of them had benefited from new roads, and some even had
electricity . The Green Revolution had led to higher produetion and income in
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many areas, but the resources had to be shared by twice as many people as two
decades earlier, and rural poverty was probably more widespread than before.
The principal objective of the team of advisers which I joined was to reform trade
and industrial policies in Bangladesh so that improved performanee through higher
productivity and produetion of better quality goods would be promoted at the
expense of rent seeking through influencing government officials to obtain licences
to import goods or to establish well protected import substitution industries. The
Trade and Industrial Policy Reform Programme (TIP) was established as a
condition for one of the Bank's large lo ans to finanee commodity import which
was given on the assumption that Bangladesh would adjust its economic structure.
TIP was itself financed by an IDA loan from the Bank, which regularly sent
missions to Bangladesh to assess if the programme was progressing satisfactorily.
However, the execution of TIP was assigned to Harvard Institute for International
Development which also provided professional backstopping by visiting staff from
its headquarters. The team was organised in several units which were located in
the Planning Commssion, the Tariff Commssion, the Ministry of Industries, and
in a para-statal organisation, the Investment Advisory Centre of Bangladesh. Part
of the management and professional backstopping of the unit who worked in the
Investment Advisory Centre was sub-contracted to a large US consultancy firm,
Arthur D. Little, and its three members were consultants with different background
whose task was to prornote new industrial activities on the basis of the findings
of the rest of the team of economists. This turned out to be a weakness of the
operation, as those team members for the first couple of years had to waIt for the
results of ongoing studies undertaken elsewhere, and, in fact, they ended up
undertaking some studies of this kind themselves.
The unit in charge of the overall management and guidanee of TIP was located in
the Planning Commssion. All units included also several locally employed
Bangladeshi highly qualified and experienced professionals as well as support
staff. The international team had only budget for a single Bangladeshi secretary
cum typist, and the team members paid themselves for the services of a person,
popularly called Mr. Fix It, who assisted them in obtaining necessary documents
from various government agencies etc. The team itself had to find housing,
furniture, personal cars etc. without support from the project. Some of the local
professionals had been seconded from other government jobs; others were
employed for the project. These professionals had to look for future job
opportunities as they had no guarantee to be given other government jobs,
preferably involving continued work as in TIP. This in itself seriously weakened
the institution building side of the programme. Moreover, in the project document
it was assumed that there would be dose cooperation between the project and the
permanent professional staff in the host organisations. It was even expected that
some of those staff members would take direct part in the research and studies
undertaken by TIP. This did not at all happen in the Planning Commission. Of
course, the TIP staff consulted regularly and frequently the professional and top
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management staff of the several industries sections in the Commssion, but these
staff members were so occupied with their ordinary work that it was practially
impossible to get any comments on our work. In the Tariff Commission the top
management followed closely the work of the TIP unit stationed there, as its
recommendations would have a significant impact on their own decision making,
but also there the involvement of the regular professional staff appears to have
been minimaL.
Two of the units, in the Planning Commssion and the Tariff Commssion, were
charge d with studies of the performanee of all manufacturing industries in the
country. The method used was to estimate the Effective Rate of Protection and the
Domestie Resources Costs of the different industries. I was lead adviser in the
Planning and Project Identification Unit in the Planning Commission, which on the
basis of these studies, should recommend the choice of industries for promotion
and suggest appropriate incentives. The task of studying individual industries was
shared between the TIP units in the two Commissions, and the two units discussed
the pro gress of the various studies at different stag es of implementation. The basic
results were similar in both sets of studies, but the unit in the Tariff Commssion
would draw conc1usions as regards an appropriate leve! of protection. One unit in
the Ministry of Industries worked on the impact of fiscal measures on industrial
development, and another unit on analysing industrial statistics with the purpose
to achieve an overall picture of the structure of manufacturing in Bangladesh.
The studies of effective protection etc. were in the end mainly built on extensive
interviews with a number of firms in the various sub-sectors. We were supplied
with the accounts of most of the firms interviewed, and in the case of the state
owned enterprises the different corporations that controlled the individual
enterprises in the several industries, provided us with data for all firms. This
materal was evidently very valuable; yet it was not always possible to extract all
the information needed for the rather sophisticated analytical method that had been
chosen.
When the work programme for TIP had been formulated, it was assumed that the
results of the latest Census of Manufacturing Industries (CMI) would be available.
This was not the case, and only after much pressure did we receive computer
printouts of the CMI 1980/81. In going through these, I found many surprising
figures, and I spent long time scrutinising all the data, and ended up writing a long
paper that pointed out numerous errors, some of which were of such a magnitude
that they falsified the overall picture completely. The outcome was that we never,
as long as I was there, received the results of the CMI 1980/81. However, we later
received the printouts of the CMI 1981/82 which was of a much better quality,
and which I used for some analytical work, inc1uding a study of the financial
flows in the manufacturing industries.
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The adviser on statistics who worked in the Ministry of Industry produced some
excellent papers on the industrial structure of the country, material which I used
extensively, but also supplemented by analysing a country wide survey of the
cottage industry which then accounted for more than one third of employment in
manufacturing. The monthly index of manufacturing had become increasingly
meaningless: as most industries had been nationalIsed shortly after independence,
government owned industries only were systematically inc1uded in the index, but
gradually more private industries had been developed, and their growth was not
accounted for. An example was the. frozen fish industry for which the index
showed falling output, while exports of such products rose rapidly. The most
important example was that the rapid growth of the garment industry was not
reflected at all in the index. I therefore calculated an adjusted index, and in my
free time I wrote several papers on industrial strategies etc. on the basis of this
analysis.6
Each individual industry study required considerable time, as the collection of data
was based on a large number of interviews. I, alone or in cooperation with
colleagues, made studiesoLthe cotton spinning industry, the role of jute in
Bangladesh's economy, the specialised yarn (rayon, nylon and silk) industries, the
basic industrial chemicals industries, and the metal working industries. The
conclusions drawn from those and the other studies were not encouraging. The
Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) is a way of measuring the importanee of the
nominal custom duty in relation to the value added created by the industry. ERP
was expressed as the ratio of the assisted value added (viz. the actual value added)
to the unassisted value added. To find the latter the major adjustment done was
to reduce the income from sales by the differenee between the domestie sales price
and the "border price" of the same product, viz. the price at which it could have
been imported. However, adjustments had also to be made for payments of duties
and excise taxes which increased the costs of the industry. It should be recalled
that value added is calculated by deducting only inputs purchased from outside
from the sales income, and such costs as wages and salaries, interests and taxes
are included in value added. ERP turned out to be very high for several branches
of industry, which not only meant that they were strongly protected against foreign
competion, but is also reflected the low productivity in domestie factories. In some
cases there was no such ERP ratio, because the unassisted value added was
negative, viz. the costs of purchased inputs used to produee the goods exceeded
the price for which the product could be imported, with nothing left for wages,
costs of capital, profit and taxes. The reason for this was not only low productivity
in manufacturing, but in some cases also the costs of raw materials and other
6 This material was later used in the work on the country study of Bangladesh undertaken by Chr.
Michelsen Institute for the Ministry of Development Cooperation in 1986. The Chr. Michelsen
Institute, Bangladesh. Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review, Annex C, Manufacturing
industries, structure, growth, problems and prospects, pp. 267-324, Bergen 1986.
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inputs purchased in the country. An extreme example was the produetion of starch:
the cost of domestie raw materials (potatoes, sweet potatoes) needed to produee
a kilo of starch exceeded the price of a kilo of imported starch. The sugar industry
was a much more important case in which the costs of domestie raw sugar
contributed to make the product more expensive than imported sigar.
Such fin dings helped to determine which industries appeared to be viable, and
which ones were operating under such constraints that they would not be able to
reach an acceptable performanee in the short run. But alsO other factors than costs
were important. The cotton spinning industry is a good example. Its performanee
was hampered by such factors as frequent power cuts; yet it did not seem to need
an excessive degree of protection, on the condition that the quality of its products
was improved. U sers of yarn, inc1uding the important handloom industry, preferred
imported yarn of more reliable quality. The metal goods industry was an
interesting case. Some very large factories had been established shortly after
independence, with excellent equipment, but their capacity was hardly utilised at
all. One reason was inadequate managerial and technical skills to develop products
that could be produced atreasonably competitive prices. The case of the
transformer factory that was built with assistance from the Soviet Union ilustrates
the importanee of continuous product development. It built transformers which
weighed almost twice as much as preferred imported models, and the extra cost
of steel only made the domestie product far costler, also in foreign exchange, than
the imported one. At the same time some other, larger units were able to produee
machinery at reasonable prices. There were also skille d workers available, a fact
that was demonstrated by the activities ofmany "road side workshops" which with
simple equipment produced spareparts and undertook repair work of moderate
quality.
The TIP teams discussed a number of policy options, and put forward many
analytical papers to support significant changes in trade and industrial policies.
One major finding of the different studies was that existing policies favoured
produetion for the domestie market at the expense of exports. Admittedly, most
industries were at that time unable to exports because of high costs and poor
quality. But there were exceptions, and adramatic change took place in one
industry. In 1979/80 Bangladesh exported ready made clothing for USD 1 milion;
in 1983/84 it had increased to USD 31 milion and in 1984/85 such exports
jumped to USD 117 millon. This was the beginning of a success which soon
made garments by far the largest export item of the country. This success was
based on one policy measure that facilitated exports: the right for exporters to
import raw materials etc. to "bonded warehouses" without paying duties and taxes.
The export oriented c10thing industry was exc1usively based on imported materials.
The TIP team argued strongly in favour of offering facilities to the domestie
spinning and weaving industries so that effecient domestie producers of high
quality goods could deliver cloth to the rapidly expanding export industry. In the
short run few factories might be able to do so, but such an encouragement could
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presurnably in the longer run increase the domestie value added of the exports of
c1othing.
TIP c1early had an impact on policy formulation in Bangladesh, as many steps
have been taken to lessen import controIs, simplify the system of import duties,
and lower many tariff rates. The TIP produced the arguments in favour of such
changes. Yet, it must be fully recognised that it was not the quality of the work
perforrned by Bangladeshi and foreign professionals in TIP which led to such
changes, but primarily strong pressure from the World Bánk and other important
donors in Bangladesh. The way in which TIP was planned aimed at strengthening
the analytical capacity of four different government host organisations. As in so
many other cases of foreign technical assistance projects, the various units ended
up working much on their own. The fact that a much larger number of
Bangladeshi professionals than foreigners worked with TIP, did not improve the
situation, as few if any of them ended up in the host organisations to continue to
work on the same sort of analytical probIerns. The involvement of the permanent
staff of the host organisations was very limited. Therefore also in this case my
conc1usion is. very pessimistie as regards the value of a project like TIP as a
means to strengthen institutions in a developing country.
The team's policy advice did meet considerable resistance both inside the
organisations concerned but much more so from professionals in universities,
research institutes, and, of course, from many in the business community who
feared that their profitable operations would be threatened. A number of seminars
were held in which the work of TIP was presented to and discussed with
academics as well as the business community. In Bangladesh there is an
increasingly large community of well trained professionals, and many of them
maintain that use of foreign consultants is unneeessary and very expensive.
However, it is also true that the predominant views amongst many of the
professionals had not changed much, and their instinet would be to defend the
existing order rather than adjust it to changing circumstances in the world. In this
respect we as members of the teambrought in new ideas to be discussed and
challenged, but they could not be disregarded.
Concluding reflections
In this article I have attempted to throw some light on three issues: the
environment under which an "institution building" advisory team was working,
including the the problems faced by the respective countries; the way in which the
teams operated; and to the extent possible I have assessed the impact of what was
done.
The environment has many facets, ranging from the economic and social
conditions prevailing in the respective countries, the political situation, the way in
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which existing institutions functioned, and also purely practical problems facing
the team.
The four countries were facing many similar economic and social probIerns. The
large majority of the people lived in rural areas and based their way of living on
agriculture and animal husbandry. While all of them had some elements of
advanced farming practices, the average performanee was weak and ways in which
to improve productivity in agriculture were major challenges. At the same time it
was evident that the creation and expansion of a manufactiiring sector was needed
to achieve and sustain economic growth and employment. However, in three of the
countries efforts by the state to create new industries had produced very
disappointing results. In all four countries considerable improvement in the
transport, communications and power supply sectors were badly needed. in order
to provide the basis for expansion ofmarketable products throughout the economy.
In consequence, sizeable increases in government development expenditure were
essential, thus requiring the mobilisation of domestie resources through more
efficient taxation and higher savings, as well as foreign aid, and also strengthened
capacity to implement projects and programmes. All four countries had established
government planning organisations that were supposed to advice on a wide range
of policy matters, and assist in improving the execution of approved programmes.
Three of the four countries were under authoritarian rule during my work there;
yet, the poli-tical environment was rather relaxed, although not without tensions,
particularly in Bangladesh. In this respect, therefore, there was room for some
degree of "good governance". The institutional structures were weak (Kenya could
be said to be an exception in this respect). Government administration operated
very slowly, civil servants gradually became inadequately remunerated, and many
institutions became overstaffed. Procedures were complicated, and much of the
work consisted of passing work and responsibilty downwards and then upwards
in the hierarchy, with the result that top management frequently took decisions
primarily based on political and other considerations, and not on professional
advice from lower leve! civil servants. The planning organisations were relatively
new (with Bangladesh as an exception), and suffered from a shortage of well
trained and experienced professionals. Much of the actual work was of a routine
character in which procedures were more important than analysis of options.
Except in Nairobi, the hot climate created a difficult working environment, but the
working and living conditions of the expatriate teams were not so difficult as to
provide an excuse for poor performanee on their part. Inadequate administrative
and logistic support by the organisations that managed the teams, did lead to some
waste of time on practical probIerns, in the Sudan especially.
The teams were in general well accepted by the colleagues in the organisations in
which they operated. However, in Bangladesh there was some opposition to the
use of expatriate personneI for the tasks assigned to the teams; there was also
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criticism of the policyactions they recommended, albeit mainly from outside the
host organisations. As I have pointed out already, in the Sudan the team faced a
language barrier problem, as the offcial language was Arabie and very little
current documentation was available in English.
In Pakistan and in Kenya the individual advisers concentrated their efforts on
working with and guiding their "counterparts" in the sections to which they were
attached, on the tasks which the respective civil servants were as signe d at any
time. This included quick and urgent reviews of cases and ptöblems on which
recommendations had to be made, and longer term analytical work, including the
preparation of a five year plan. In the Sudan, however, the team was instructed to
establish work plans for the different sections of the planning organisation, an
attempt which in my opinion was futile and was not very successful: under-
standably the cases referred to the sections by top management had priority over
work plans outline d by an expatriate advisory team. The situation in Bangladesh
was completely different. The team had be en given a special task to be perforrned
together with a large group of Bangladeshi professionals recruited by the project.
This work was to be undertaken in c10se collaboration with the permanent staff of
the organisations in which the various components of the project were located.
However, in several organisations the involvement of the permanent staff in the
project operations proved to be minimal or even non-existent.
It is impossible to assess with any certainty the real impact of the work of a group
of advisers on the subsequent performanee of their host organisation. In Pakistan,
Kenya and the Sudan the teams worked inside an established organisation, in c10se
cooperation with counterparts of the permanent staff. There is no doubt that
members of these advisory teams, well trained, highly motivated and hard working
professionals as they were, had a positive impact on many of their counterparts.
However, the long term impact was no doubt constrained because of the daily
pressure of routine work. Too often this meant the end of most real analytical
work when the advisers left and thus limited effective institution building as the
proeess of improved working practices. Moreover, many of the civil servants who
had worked as counterparts of foreign advisers were quickly moved to other
assignments in which they could make little use of what they might have learned.
Some very promising officials ended up working abroad, often in international
organisations.
Over the years the supply of well trained young professionals has increased
substantially in the developing countries, and in turn this has strengthened some
of these institutions to the point where they can now benefit from relatively short
term consultaneies by individual experts in specialised fields. The impact of the
TIP project in Bangladesh on institution building is particularly difficult to assess.
The project definitely had a decisive impact on trade and industrial policies at the
time, but as, in fact, it operated mainly in isolation from the day to day work in
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the regular and mainstream public institutions, its effectiveness and impact was
probably but transitory.
In respect of institution building through even long term foreign advisory
assignments, therefore, my own experience must be characterised as disappointing
and pessimistie. When I worked in Bangladesh in the early 1980s, the then
representative of the W orId Bank also stated that the field in which his
organisation had suffered most disappointments was institution building. Similar
views were also expressed by the representative of United Nations Development
Programme. Such experi-ences notwithstanding, the donors cannot cease their
support of all institution building. However, a crucial condition for success is that
the host authorities fully support the developemt of the chosen institution and that
it wil be adequately staffed with a professionally competent local staff who can
benefit from such assistance.
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